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Calls for reparations for historic injustices dominate current Namibian discourse.
Such calls are directed to both the German and Namibian governments. The
German government is called upon to take full responsibility for the heinous crimes
committed against the Ovaherero and Nama peoples during the 1904–1908
genocide. After all, the impugned genocidal acts were perpetrated under the
infamous orders of General Lothar von Trotha, who acted in the name of the
German Kaiser. The Namibian government is called on to facilitate the restoration
of ancestral lands confiscated from indigenous communities during the colonial and
apartheid period.
Many, including Namibian-born Germans, fiercely oppose calls for reparations.
For instance, some call them backward-looking, vengeful and opportunistic. While
the German government appears ready to atone for its role in colonial injustices,
such readiness comes with questionable caveats. On the other side, the Namibian
government has adopted a rather patronizing and know-it-all approach to the
reparations debacle. The biggest obstacle to reparations, however, appears to be
the law itself.
The grave violations committed against the Ovaherero and Nama peoples predate
the establishment of international human rights law. This presents a real and
formidable obstacle. The intertemporal principle deserves calling out. Under this
doctrine, the validity of an act and its legal entailments are to be judged with
reference to the law in force at the time the act was performed, not at a later date
when a legal dispute arises. Following this doctrine, the vile acts committed against
the Ovaherero and Nama peoples cannot be considered a genocide, because such
a crime did not exist at the time. The German government invokes this legal doctrine
to evade legal liability for the 1904–1908 genocidal acts.
The Namibian government similarly invokes archaic legal principles to suppress
and reject ancestral land claims. The 28 August 2019 Tsumib v. Government of
the Republic of Namibia judgment is a case in point. In this case, eight members of
the Hai||om community sought the court’s permission to represent their community
in taking legal action to reclaim their ancestral land rights over Etosha National
Park and the Mangetti area. They submitted six claims on behalf of the Hai||om
people. The court threw out the case without considering its merits. It held that
the representatives did not have the necessary locus standi to represent the
Hai||om people. Namibia’s law on standing is very restrictive. For example, it
does not recognize class action, whereby one or more plaintiffs litigate on behalf
of themselves and other similarly situated persons. The Tsumib judgment is
disturbingly worrisome and regrettable. The case presented an ideal opportunity to
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develop archaic standing rules to espouse the Namibian constitution’s value, spirit
and purport. Yet, it appears that our courts are not ready to do this.
My take-home message is that efforts to redress colonial injustices in Namibia
cannot be resolved by relying on the very laws that caused such injustices. Following
the Tsumib judgment, there is a strong case to be made for exploring and investing
in restorative justice processes as a way to achieve reconciliatory justice for colonial
injustices in Namibia.
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